The third type of propaganda that Weaver defined (I am quoting form Arthur Gordian’s article at Social Matter) is ancient. It is the tactics of the sophist. If you are losing an argument, redefine the terms, move the goal posts, clutch your pearls, and scream that you are oppressed.

Before the writing of Plato, the word “sophist” could be used as either a respectful or contemptuous title, much like the word “intellectual” can be used today. It was in Plato’s dialogue, Sophist, that the first record of an attempt to answer the question “What is a Sophist?” is made. Plato described Sophists as paid hunters after the young and wealthy, as merchants of knowledge, as athletes in a contest of words, and purgers of souls. From Plato’s assessment of Sophists it could be concluded that Sophists do not offer true knowledge, but only an opinion of things. Plato describes them as shadows of the true early Sophists and wrote, “…the art of contradiction making, descended from an insincere kind of conceited mimicry, of the semblance-making breed, derived from image making, distinguished as portion, not divine but human, of production, that presents, a shadow play of words—such are the blood and the lineage which can, with perfect truth, be assigned to the authentic Sophist”. Plato sought to separate the Sophist from the Philosopher. Where a Sophist was a person who makes his living through deception, a philosopher was a lover of wisdom who sought truth.

Infogalactic has got it wrong: Intellectual is now a term of contempt, after the writings to Taleb. But to the quote and the examples: by definition of the left, anyone who is not cisgendered and white is not a terrorist. They are practicing progressive liberation.

The form of propaganda known as False Definition, the third type described by Richard Weaver in his essay collection In Defense of Tradition, is the broadest and most flexible of the three major forms. False Definition includes gaslighting, goalpost-shifting, appeal to [false] authority, appeal to [false] consensus, the logical fallacy of False Cause and Begging the Question, and nearly any other argument that relies on purposeful manipulation of the meaning of words. This makes it particularly easy to find in practice, but particularly difficult to analyze as a scholar. The category is just so broad that any attempt to isolate and interpret this form of propaganda inevitably leads to a reductionist approach which ignores a key element of False Definition. There is one area, however, where the Cathedral and its media mouthpieces illustrate Type III propaganda in nearly its full depth: the media’s non-approach to left-wing terrorism.
…Since the essence of False Definition is the perversion of the meaning of words into tools of political propaganda, the emphasis will be on these kinds of tricks, though this is not to say that left-wing propagandists fail to also use Type I (the Big Lie) and Type II (False Dichotomy) when dealing with leftist terror.

Of course, the term whose manipulation forms the groundwork of propaganda is “terrorism” itself. Every dictionary and textbook defines terrorism in nearly the same way: violence perpetrated by an actor with political motive whose goal is to create political change. The differentia specifica of terrorism, then, is not the kind of violence or even the political beliefs of the perpetrator but that the purpose behind it is to create political change out of violence. Nevertheless, from media figures to the broken records on Twitter, leftist propagandists consistently attempt to muddy the definition of terrorism for their benefit. Credentialed so-called experts on popular media shows attempt to redefine terrorism as any gun-related crime. Two-bit shock-jockeys imply that terrorism is a dog-whistle for non-white killers, which gets gleefully repeated by the echo-chamber of Twitter and Facebook. Paranoid, solipsistic ethnic activists define terrorism as neighborhood policing or public school redistricting.

The effectiveness of this propaganda rests on the idea that by confusing the definition of the term, opponents of the Left will not be able to successfully oppose and prevent future terrorist attacks. It is an attempt to scramble the ability of enemies to successfully identify and orient themselves in accord with the friend-foe dichotomy. In essence, it is like a form of radar jamming which serves to keep the anti-leftist flying blind. Without the ability to rally and organize after a terrorist attack, this propaganda serves to interrupt the OODA loop of the terror target and prevent any form of engagement of the enemy. Just like the Republicans spent years arguing over who exactly was responsible for 9/11, by keeping the base of the Right confused as to what exactly occurred after a terror attack, the Left removes the primary weakness of terror tactics: their ability to unite the opposition against the perpetrators of terror.

Sometimes, the attack is too large or too obvious for the Left to deny as terrorism. The information on social media makes it impossible sometimes to control the narrative and deny that terrorism has occurred. In that situation, Type III propaganda can still be utilized to cover for the causes of left-wing terrorism. False Definition is not applied to the act but to the person who committed the act and works by defining away left-wing motives.

The ancients knew better. They discussed ideas, and considered the evidence. If in doubt, they talked to those with more experience. Consider how Socrates counselled Hippocrates.

Well now, I said, you and I are going to Protagoras, and we are ready to pay him money on your behalf. If our own means are sufficient, and we can gain him with these, we shall be only too glad; but if not, then we are to spend the money of your friends as well. Now suppose, that while we are thus enthusiastically pursuing our object some one were to say to us: Tell me, Socrates, and you Hippocrates, what is Protagoras, and why are you going to pay him money,-how should we answer? I know that Pheidias is a sculptor, and that Homer is a poet; but what appellation is given to Protagoras? how is he designated?

They call him a Sophist, Socrates, he replied.
Then we are going to pay our money to him in the character of a Sophist?

Certainly.
But suppose a person were to ask this further question: And how about yourself? What will Protagoras make of you, if you go to see him?

He answered, with a blush upon his face (for the day was just beginning to dawn, so that I could see him): Unless this differs in some way from the former instances, I suppose that he will make a Sophist of me.

By the gods, I said, and are you not ashamed at having to appear before the Hellenes in the character of a Sophist?

Indeed, Socrates, to confess the truth, I am.
But you should not assume, Hippocrates, that the instruction of Protagoras is of this nature: may you not learn of him in the same way that you learned the arts of the grammarian, musician, or trainer, not with the view of making any of them a profession, but only as a part of education, and because a private gentleman and freeman ought to know them?

Just so, he said; and that, in my opinion, is a far truer account of the teaching of Protagoras.

I said: I wonder whether you know what you are doing?
And what am I doing?
You are going to commit your soul to the care of a man whom you call a Sophist. And yet I hardly think that you know what a Sophist is; and if not, then you do not even know to whom you are committing your soul and whether the thing to which you commit yourself be good or evil.

I certainly think that I do know, he replied.
Then tell me, what do you imagine that he is?
I take him to be one who knows wise things, he replied, as his name implies.

And might you not, I said, affirm this of the painter and of the carpenter also: Do not they, too, know wise things? But suppose a person were to ask us: In what are the painters wise? We should answer: In what relates to the making of likenesses, and similarly of other things. And if he were further to ask: What is the wisdom of the Sophist, and what is the manufacture over which he presides?-how should we answer him?

How should we answer him, Socrates? What other answer could there be but that he presides over the art which makes men eloquent?

Yes, I replied, that is very likely true, but not enough; for in the answer a further question is involved: Of what does the Sophist make a man talk eloquently? The player on the lyre may be supposed to make a man talk eloquently about that which he makes him understand, that is about playing the lyre. Is not that true?

Yes.
Then about what does the Sophist make him eloquent? Must not he make him eloquent in that which he understands?

Yes, that may be assumed.
And what is that which the Sophist knows and makes his disciple know?

Indeed, he said, I cannot tell.
Then I proceeded to say: Well, but are you aware of the danger which you are incurring? If you were going to commit your body to some one, who might do good or harm to it, would you not carefully consider and ask the opinion of your friends and kindred, and deliberate many days as to whether you should give him the care of your body? But when the soul is in question, which you hold to be of far more value than the body, and upon the good or evil of which depends the well-being of your all,-about this never consulted either with your father or with your brother or with any one of us who are your companions. But no sooner does this foreigner appear, than you instantly commit your soul to his keeping. In the evening, as you say, you hear of him, and in the morning you go to him, never deliberating or taking the opinion of any one as to whether you ought to intrust yourself to him or not;-you have quite made up your mind that you will at all hazards be a pupil of Protagoras, and are prepared to expend all the property of yourself and of your friends in carrying out at any price this determination, although, as you admit, you do not know him, and have never spoken with him: and you call him a Sophist, but are manifestly ignorant of what a Sophist is; and yet you are going to commit yourself to his keeping.

When he heard me say this, he replied: No other inference, Socrates, can be drawn from your words.

I proceeded: Is not a Sophist, Hippocrates, one who deals wholesale or retail in the food of the soul? To me that appears to be his nature.

And what, Socrates, is the food of the soul?
Surely, I said, knowledge is the food of the soul; and we must take care, my friend, that the Sophist does not deceive us when he praises what he sells, like the dealers wholesale or retail who sell the food of the body; for they praise indiscriminately all their goods, without knowing what are really beneficial or hurtful: neither do their customers know, with the exception of any trainer or physician who may happen to buy of them. In like manner those who carry about the wares of knowledge, and make the round of the cities, and sell or retail them to any customer who is in want of them, praise them all alike; though I should not wonder, O my friend, if many of them were really ignorant of their effect upon the soul; and their customers equally ignorant, unless he who buys of them happens to be a physician of the soul. If, therefore, you have understanding of what is good and evil, you may safely buy knowledge of Protagoras or of any one; but if not, then, O my friend, pause, and do not hazard your dearest interests at a game of chance. For there is far greater peril in buying knowledge than in buying meat and drink: the one you purchase of the wholesale or retail dealer, and carry them away in other vessels, and before you receive them into the body as food, you may deposit them at home and call in any experienced friend who knows what is good to be eaten or drunken, and what not, and how much, and when; and then the danger of purchasing them is not so great. But you cannot buy the wares of knowledge and carry them away in another vessel; when you have paid for them you must receive them into the soul and go your way, either greatly harmed or greatly benefited; and therefore we should deliberate and take counsel with our elders; for we are still young-too young to determine such a matter.

If you want to deal with the modern sophists, forget that man is the measure of all things. Instead compare man to that which is greater than him. And consider the assumptions behind the need to change definitions and argue against nature, truth, beauty and God. For the modern leftist is selling lies, and calling it knowledge.